🇿🇲 ANALYSIS | Can a Candidate Win Without Southern, Western and North-Western Provinces?
Following our Tuesday analysis on Zambia’s 8.78 million registered voters and the arithmetic of the 50%+1 electoral system, some readers argued that opposition candidates such as Brian Mundubile and Makebi Zulu do not need to invest political energy in Southern, Western and North-Western provinces because those regions are traditionally associated with the UPND.
It is a fair argument. But does the mathematics support it?
The Electoral Commission of Zambia’s certified register places Southern Province at 1,103,275 voters, Western Province at 629,352 and North-Western Province at 524,195. Together, these three provinces account for 2,256,822 registered voters.
That is more than a quarter of the entire electorate.
For any serious presidential campaign, voluntarily surrendering a voter pool of more than 2.2 million people is not a strategic decision. It is a mathematical gamble.
The argument becomes even more difficult when viewed through the results of the 2021 presidential election.
President Hakainde Hichilema won six provinces: Southern, Western, North-Western, Lusaka, Copperbelt and Central. Edgar Lungu won Eastern, Northern, Luapula and Muchinga.
What often gets overlooked is not simply who won which province. It is the size of the margins.
In Southern Province, Hichilema secured 601,998 votes, representing about 91 percent of votes cast. In North-Western Province, he received 263,473 votes, representing about 87 percent. In Western Province, he obtained 276,280 votes, representing roughly 82 percent.
These were not ordinary victories. They were overwhelming margins.
By contrast, the provinces won by Lungu produced much narrower outcomes. Eastern Province delivered about 54 percent. Northern Province gave him 56 percent. Luapula produced 60 percent, while Muchinga returned approximately 61 percent
The distinction matters.
Under a first-past-the-post system, winning a province is often enough. Under Zambia’s 50%+1 model, margins matter as much as victories. A candidate who wins one province by 90 percent and loses another by 55 percent is still accumulating a larger national advantage.
This is where the challenge for any opposition formation becomes clear.
If Southern, Western and North-Western continue producing large margins for the ruling party, those deficits must be recovered elsewhere. Not symbolically. Numerically.
The opposition would need overwhelming victories in Luapula, Muchinga, Northern and Eastern provinces while simultaneously achieving major gains in Lusaka and Copperbelt.
That is a much larger task than simply retaining traditional support.
The arithmetic becomes even more demanding when Lusaka and Copperbelt are considered.
Lusaka now has 1,430,889 registered voters. Copperbelt has 1,296,446. Together, they account for more than 2.7 million voters, making them the most influential electoral bloc in the country.
In 2021, Hichilema won both provinces. On the Copperbelt, he secured 420,443 votes against Lungu’s 300,413. In Lusaka, he polled 442,253 votes against Lungu’s 357,674.
Any opposition strategy built around bypassing Southern, Western and North-Western provinces therefore carries a second requirement: it must also reverse the outcome in Lusaka and Copperbelt.
That is easier said than done.
Even if one assumes declining popularity for the ruling party in urban areas, electoral mathematics rarely allows a complete collapse. Incumbent governments almost always retain a substantial vote share even in difficult elections. Those votes still count toward the national total.
This means the opposition cannot simply focus on reducing the UPND vote. It must simultaneously increase its own vote to levels capable of overcoming losses elsewhere.
There is another complication. The political map of 2026 is not identical to that of 2021.
The UPND has spent four years governing as the incumbent party. Through by-elections and local government contests, it has expanded its presence in parts of Northern Province, Muchinga and Eastern Province. Kasama’s mayoral seat moved into the ruling party column. Several former PF MPs and local leaders have since joined the UPND. In Eastern Province, political alignments have also shifted, including among local government figures and former opposition structures.
None of this guarantees presidential votes.
But it does suggest that the opposition can no longer assume complete dominance across regions that once voted overwhelmingly for PF.
The burden therefore falls on coalition construction.
An opposition candidate seeking to unseat the UPND does not merely need to win traditional strongholds. They must expand beyond them. They must reduce ruling party margins in Southern, Western and North-Western provinces. They must compete effectively in Lusaka and Copperbelt. They must retain support in Northern, Luapula, Muchinga and Eastern provinces. And they must do all this while maintaining turnout levels capable of crossing the threshold.
This is the reality of Zambia’s electoral system. The question is not whether change is possible. Every election carries that possibility.
The question is whether any opposition formation can assemble a coalition broad enough, geographically and numerically, to overcome an incumbent party that already begins the contest with significant advantages in voter distribution, organisational reach, and provincial spread.
Politics may be driven by momentum. But under 50%+1, victory is ultimately determined by arithmetic.
© The People’s Brief | Ollus R. Ndomu
Maybe in the past but not now, this time it’s practically impossible. So you can avoid those Provinces at your own peril.
