ANALYSIS | Mundubile’s Victory: What Numbers Say
ANALYSIS | Mundubile’s Victory: What Numbers Say
Campaigns are built on speeches. Elections are decided by arithmetic.
Brian Mundubile has emerged as the undisputed face of Zambia’s opposition in the 2026 race. In just two months, the Tonse Alliance has assembled large crowds across Eastern, Northern and Muchinga provinces, dominating the opposition conversation while other parties struggle to maintain campaign visibility. The momentum is real. The enthusiasm is visible. But the question now shifts from campaign optics to electoral mathematics.
What would it actually take for Mundubile to become Zambia’s 8th Republican President?
The first point is that the Tonse Alliance appears to have concentrated much of its campaign energy in what were traditionally Patriotic Front strongholds. At the same time, senior alliance figures have publicly questioned the value of investing campaign resources in Southern, Western and North Western provinces, arguing that those areas are firmly behind the UPND. If that strategy remains unchanged, the electoral path becomes much narrower.
According to the 2026 voter register, Southern Province has 1,103,275 registered voters, Western has 629,352, while North Western has 524,195. Combined, the three provinces account for 2,256,822 registered voters, representing more than one quarter of Zambia’s electorate. Historically, these provinces have also recorded some of the strongest support for President Hakainde Hichilema. If Tonse effectively concedes these provinces, even without saying so formally, it begins the election from a significant numerical disadvantage.
The alliance would therefore have to recover that deficit elsewhere.
The former PF electoral corridor comprising Eastern, Northern, Muchinga and Luapula contains approximately 2.98 million registered voters. Assuming a national turnout of around 70 percent, those four provinces could produce just over 2 million valid votes. Even if Mundubile secured an impressive 70 percent of those votes, the alliance would collect roughly 1.46 million votes from its strongest terrain.
That alone would not be enough to reach State House.
The next battlefield becomes Lusaka, Copperbelt and Central Province, which together account for more than 3.5 million registered voters, the largest concentration anywhere in the country. At a 70 percent turnout, those provinces could produce nearly 2.5 million votes. If Mundubile managed to secure 55 percent of those votes, he would add approximately 1.36 million to his tally. Combined with a commanding performance in the former PF strongholds and a small share from Southern, Western and North Western, the alliance would approach the constitutional threshold of 50 percent plus one.
This projection immediately raises another question. How realistic is such a result?
History suggests the task is formidable. In 2021, Edgar Lungu contested as an incumbent president with the full machinery of government, an established party structure and nationwide organisation. Even under those conditions, the Patriotic Front did not achieve 70 percent across the Northern Circuit. Hakainde Hichilema won Northern Province outright, came within touching distance in Eastern Province and remained competitive across much of the region. If the PF, while in government, could not completely dominate those provinces, voters are entitled to ask what has fundamentally changed to make such overwhelming victories more achievable today.
There is another complication. Since taking office, the UPND has deliberately recruited several influential former PF Members of Parliament and local political figures into its ranks, particularly in regions where it previously struggled. In many rural constituencies, popular parliamentary candidates often strengthen the presidential vote through established constituency networks and local mobilisation. Even a modest swing of two or three percentage points towards the UPND in Eastern, Northern, Muchinga or Luapula would significantly alter the national arithmetic.
None of this means Mundubile cannot win. Politics has a habit of surprising analysts. Campaigns influence public opinion. Turnout can exceed expectations. Economic concerns can reshape electoral choices. Elections are never decided on paper.
The numbers do show, however, that a Tonse victory requires several demanding conditions to occur simultaneously. The alliance would need overwhelming victories in its preferred provinces, major breakthroughs in Lusaka, Copperbelt and Central, while preventing the UPND from reproducing the large margins it has historically enjoyed in Southern, Western and North Western provinces.
The mountain is climbable.
Whether it is politically realistic is a judgment that ultimately belongs to the Zambian voter.
© The People’s Brief | Ollus R. Ndomu
This is arguably one of the best analysis I’ve ever read. Simple, but so clear and that is what is going to happen. HH is starting this race with guaranteed 1.9m votes from his stronghold. And then he has made more inroads than he had in 2021 in PF strongholds. This election will mirror the 1996 FJT Chiluba vs Dean Mung’omba. I will be so shocked if HH doesn’t register an 80% victory in these elections. Mundubile will cry and retire, watch the space!!!
The problem with the PF crowd is that they believe their own lies. Fact is, they are headed for another severe whipping, worse than 2021.
I will say this again. Mr. Mundubile must put in place a robust vote guarding and monitoring mechanism so that when he loses (not if he loses), he should not claim rigging using the deceptive crowds at his rallies as evidence.




