CAB 3 IS NOW LAW. BUT IS IT THE END OF THE STORY?
By Reason Wafawarova
President Emmerson Mnangagwa has signed Constitutional Amendment Bill No. 3 into law.
For those who pushed the amendment, this marks the end of a long political project. For those who opposed it, it marks the beginning of a new struggle.
The ink on the President’s signature may have dried, but the constitutional and political battles are far from over.
Many people are understandably asking the obvious question:
What happens now?
The answer is that there are several possible paths ahead.
The legal battle is still alive.
Signing a Bill into law does not automatically end litigation against it.
Quite the opposite.
Several legal challenges remain before the courts.
The Constitutional Court has already heard one challenge and reserved judgment. During those proceedings, the Court indicated that the appropriate time to determine many constitutional questions would be after Parliament had completed the legislative process rather than before it.
That time has now arrived.
The courts still have before them challenges touching on fundamental questions.
Did CAB 3 unlawfully bypass a national referendum?
Was Resolution One, the ZANU PF resolution that gave birth to CAB 3, itself unconstitutional?
Were MPs subjected to inducements that compromised the integrity of Parliament?
Did the public consultation process satisfy constitutional requirements?
Were citizens genuinely heard, or merely processed through a choreographed exercise designed to manufacture consent?
Reports indicate that dozens of Members of Parliament were formally served with court papers by constituents seeking to challenge their participation in the process.
The courts therefore remain one important battlefield.
Whether they ultimately uphold or strike down aspects of the amendment remains to be seen.
Procedure versus legitimacy:
Supporters of CAB 3 argue that every procedural box has been ticked.
The party adopted Resolution One.
The Ministry of Justice drafted principles.
The Attorney-General prepared the Bill.
Cabinet approved it.
Public hearings were conducted.
Parliament debated it.
The Senate approved it.
The President signed it.
From a procedural checklist, they claim complete victory.
But constitutional democracy is not merely about ticking boxes.
A process can satisfy procedural formalities while still lacking democratic legitimacy.
A Parliament can vote under overwhelming party discipline.
Public hearings can occur without meaningful public participation.
Consultations can become performances.
Consent can be manufactured rather than freely given.
Democracy is measured not only by procedure, but by freedom, independence, accountability and genuine public participation.
That is precisely where many critics believe CAB 3 falls short.
Politics may ultimately decide what law cannot:
History teaches that not every law survives simply because it was enacted.
Some laws collapse under political pressure.
Others become impossible to implement.
Others are repealed by future governments.
Some simply lose public legitimacy.
Zimbabwe itself offers examples.
Laws once presented as permanent fixtures—including legislation such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA)—were eventually repealed after years of sustained political and civic pressure.
The lesson is simple.
Passing a law is not necessarily the end of its life.
Sometimes it is merely the beginning.
The Kenya lesson:
Recent African history offers another example.
In 2024, the Kenyan government introduced the Finance Bill, proposing significant tax increases to address mounting public debt.
What followed surprised both the government and the continent.
Young Kenyans, organised largely through social media rather than political parties, launched nationwide protests.
The demonstrations culminated in protesters breaching Parliament itself.
The government responded with force, resulting in dozens of deaths and widespread arrests.
Yet despite having the numbers in Parliament, President William Ruto ultimately declined to sign the Finance Bill into law and later reshuffled his Cabinet.
The protests did not resolve Kenya’s economic problems.
But they demonstrated something important.
Even governments with parliamentary majorities can retreat when confronted by sustained political pressure and overwhelming public resistance.
Zimbabwe’s political circumstances differ significantly from Kenya’s. The constitutional issues, institutions and political dynamics are not the same. Even so, the Kenyan experience illustrates that legislative victories do not always settle political disputes. Sometimes they merely move the contest from Parliament into the courts, onto the streets, and into the arena of public opinion.
The political question:
There is another possibility.
Zimbabwe’s political history has repeatedly shown that major constitutional moments are not shaped solely by legal arguments.
Political developments inside the governing establishment have often proved equally consequential.
Whether internal disagreements over CAB 3 evolve into meaningful political action remains uncertain.
There is considerable public speculation about divisions within ZANU PF, but speculation should not be mistaken for established fact. What is clear is that constitutional disputes of this magnitude rarely remain confined to courtrooms.
This is not the end:
CAB 3 has become law. That much is beyond dispute.
Whether it becomes settled constitutional reality is another matter entirely.
Its future now depends on three forces.
The courts. Politics. The people.
History reminds us that constitutions derive their ultimate authority not merely from presidential signatures, parliamentary votes or party resolutions, but from public legitimacy. A law may be enacted in a single day. Its acceptance—or rejection—by the nation can take years.
President Mnangagwa has signed CAB 3.
The constitutional struggle over it, however, has only entered its next chapter.
There are reports reaching us that say big players related to Zimbabwe’s kingmaking military tradition are stepping in, and the military influence we saw in 2017 cannot be entirely ruled out.
This will not end well. Zambia must brace for an increased Zimbabwean migrants. South Africa has chased them away, now they have only two options Botswana and Zambia.
